internal/tenant/ provides FS, a sandboxed handle for a single tenant's notes directory. Implementation strategy: - Defence in depth: every relative path is validated up front (rejects "..", absolute paths, NUL bytes, empty), then handed to os.Root (Go 1.24+) which enforces the boundary at the syscall layer using openat(2)+RESOLVE_BENEATH on Linux. This closes TOCTOU races and symlink-target swapping. - WriteFile is atomic (write to .tmp, rename in-root). Mode 0o600 on files, 0o700 on directories. Tenant root is created with 0o700 by Open(). - Errors are normalised: fs.ErrNotExist -> ErrNotFound, anything os.Root rejects as "outside" the root -> ErrInvalidPath. The HTTP layer can map cleanly to 404 / 400. Tests cover the full traversal attack surface — "../", absolute paths, mixed separators, NUL bytes, "." and "" — plus symlink escapes and cross-tenant isolation. All vectors return errors; none escape the root. Closes #10. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
181 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
181 lines
4.3 KiB
Go
package tenant
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import (
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"errors"
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"os"
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"path/filepath"
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"runtime"
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"testing"
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)
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func newFS(t *testing.T) (*FS, string) {
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t.Helper()
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dir := t.TempDir()
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fs, err := Open(filepath.Join(dir, "user"))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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t.Cleanup(func() { _ = fs.Close() })
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return fs, dir
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}
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func TestWriteReadStat(t *testing.T) {
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fs, _ := newFS(t)
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if err := fs.WriteFile("a/b/note.md", []byte("hello")); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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got, err := fs.ReadFile("a/b/note.md")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if string(got) != "hello" {
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t.Errorf("got %q", got)
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}
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fi, err := fs.Stat("a/b/note.md")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if fi.Size() != 5 {
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t.Errorf("size %d", fi.Size())
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}
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}
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func TestRemove(t *testing.T) {
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fs, _ := newFS(t)
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_ = fs.WriteFile("x.md", []byte("x"))
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if err := fs.Remove("x.md"); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if _, err := fs.ReadFile("x.md"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
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t.Errorf("expected ErrNotFound, got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestList(t *testing.T) {
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fs, _ := newFS(t)
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_ = fs.WriteFile("one.md", []byte("1"))
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_ = fs.WriteFile("sub/two.md", []byte("2"))
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root, err := fs.List(".")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if len(root) != 2 {
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t.Errorf("root entries: %v", root)
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}
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sub, err := fs.List("sub")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if len(sub) != 1 || sub[0] != "two.md" {
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t.Errorf("sub entries: %v", sub)
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}
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}
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// TestPathTraversalAttacks covers every traversal vector we care
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// about. They must all be blocked.
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func TestPathTraversalAttacks(t *testing.T) {
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fs, dir := newFS(t)
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// Plant a file outside the tenant root that we'll try to reach.
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outside := filepath.Join(dir, "secret.txt")
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if err := os.WriteFile(outside, []byte("classified"), 0o600); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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cases := []string{
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"../secret.txt",
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"../../secret.txt",
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"a/../../secret.txt",
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"./../secret.txt",
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"/etc/passwd",
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`\windows\system32`,
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"\x00",
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"foo\x00bar",
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"..",
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".",
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"",
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}
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for _, p := range cases {
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t.Run(p, func(t *testing.T) {
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if _, err := fs.ReadFile(p); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("ReadFile(%q) succeeded unexpectedly", p)
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}
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if err := fs.WriteFile(p, []byte("x")); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("WriteFile(%q) succeeded unexpectedly", p)
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}
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if err := fs.Remove(p); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("Remove(%q) succeeded unexpectedly", p)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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// TestSymlinkEscapeBlocked verifies that a symlink whose target is
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// outside the tenant root cannot be used to read or write files.
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// os.Root refuses to follow symlinks that escape the root.
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func TestSymlinkEscapeBlocked(t *testing.T) {
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if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
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t.Skip("symlink semantics differ on windows")
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}
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fs, dir := newFS(t)
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outside := filepath.Join(dir, "outside.txt")
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if err := os.WriteFile(outside, []byte("classified"), 0o600); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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// Drop a symlink inside the tenant dir pointing at the outside
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// file. We do this via os directly because FS doesn't expose
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// symlink creation (and rightfully so).
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if err := os.Symlink(outside, filepath.Join(fs.Dir(), "escape")); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if _, err := fs.ReadFile("escape"); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("ReadFile through symlink succeeded; expected error")
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}
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}
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func TestRootIsolation(t *testing.T) {
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// Two FS instances rooted at sibling dirs cannot see each other.
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parent := t.TempDir()
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a, err := Open(filepath.Join(parent, "a"))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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defer a.Close()
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b, err := Open(filepath.Join(parent, "b"))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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defer b.Close()
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_ = a.WriteFile("note.md", []byte("a"))
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if _, err := b.ReadFile("note.md"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
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t.Errorf("b read a's file: %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := b.ReadFile("../a/note.md"); err == nil {
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t.Errorf("b reached a via traversal")
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}
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}
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func TestMissingFileReturnsErrNotFound(t *testing.T) {
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fs, _ := newFS(t)
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if _, err := fs.ReadFile("missing.md"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
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t.Errorf("got %v", err)
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}
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if _, err := fs.Stat("missing.md"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
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t.Errorf("got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestPermissions(t *testing.T) {
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if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
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t.Skip("permission semantics differ on windows")
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}
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fs, _ := newFS(t)
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fi, err := os.Stat(fs.Dir())
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if mode := fi.Mode().Perm(); mode != 0o700 {
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t.Errorf("expected 0700 on tenant dir, got %o", mode)
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}
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}
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