Files
librenotes/internal/tenant/fs_test.go
T
libretechandClaude Opus 4.7 d9b80bacca Add per-tenant filesystem isolation
internal/tenant/ provides FS, a sandboxed handle for a single
tenant's notes directory. Implementation strategy:

- Defence in depth: every relative path is validated up front
  (rejects "..", absolute paths, NUL bytes, empty), then handed
  to os.Root (Go 1.24+) which enforces the boundary at the
  syscall layer using openat(2)+RESOLVE_BENEATH on Linux. This
  closes TOCTOU races and symlink-target swapping.
- WriteFile is atomic (write to .tmp, rename in-root). Mode 0o600
  on files, 0o700 on directories. Tenant root is created with
  0o700 by Open().
- Errors are normalised: fs.ErrNotExist -> ErrNotFound, anything
  os.Root rejects as "outside" the root -> ErrInvalidPath. The
  HTTP layer can map cleanly to 404 / 400.

Tests cover the full traversal attack surface — "../", absolute
paths, mixed separators, NUL bytes, "." and "" — plus symlink
escapes and cross-tenant isolation. All vectors return errors;
none escape the root.

Closes #10.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-28 22:17:38 +02:00

181 lines
4.3 KiB
Go

package tenant
import (
"errors"
"os"
"path/filepath"
"runtime"
"testing"
)
func newFS(t *testing.T) (*FS, string) {
t.Helper()
dir := t.TempDir()
fs, err := Open(filepath.Join(dir, "user"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = fs.Close() })
return fs, dir
}
func TestWriteReadStat(t *testing.T) {
fs, _ := newFS(t)
if err := fs.WriteFile("a/b/note.md", []byte("hello")); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
got, err := fs.ReadFile("a/b/note.md")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if string(got) != "hello" {
t.Errorf("got %q", got)
}
fi, err := fs.Stat("a/b/note.md")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if fi.Size() != 5 {
t.Errorf("size %d", fi.Size())
}
}
func TestRemove(t *testing.T) {
fs, _ := newFS(t)
_ = fs.WriteFile("x.md", []byte("x"))
if err := fs.Remove("x.md"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := fs.ReadFile("x.md"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
t.Errorf("expected ErrNotFound, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestList(t *testing.T) {
fs, _ := newFS(t)
_ = fs.WriteFile("one.md", []byte("1"))
_ = fs.WriteFile("sub/two.md", []byte("2"))
root, err := fs.List(".")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(root) != 2 {
t.Errorf("root entries: %v", root)
}
sub, err := fs.List("sub")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(sub) != 1 || sub[0] != "two.md" {
t.Errorf("sub entries: %v", sub)
}
}
// TestPathTraversalAttacks covers every traversal vector we care
// about. They must all be blocked.
func TestPathTraversalAttacks(t *testing.T) {
fs, dir := newFS(t)
// Plant a file outside the tenant root that we'll try to reach.
outside := filepath.Join(dir, "secret.txt")
if err := os.WriteFile(outside, []byte("classified"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
cases := []string{
"../secret.txt",
"../../secret.txt",
"a/../../secret.txt",
"./../secret.txt",
"/etc/passwd",
`\windows\system32`,
"\x00",
"foo\x00bar",
"..",
".",
"",
}
for _, p := range cases {
t.Run(p, func(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := fs.ReadFile(p); err == nil {
t.Errorf("ReadFile(%q) succeeded unexpectedly", p)
}
if err := fs.WriteFile(p, []byte("x")); err == nil {
t.Errorf("WriteFile(%q) succeeded unexpectedly", p)
}
if err := fs.Remove(p); err == nil {
t.Errorf("Remove(%q) succeeded unexpectedly", p)
}
})
}
}
// TestSymlinkEscapeBlocked verifies that a symlink whose target is
// outside the tenant root cannot be used to read or write files.
// os.Root refuses to follow symlinks that escape the root.
func TestSymlinkEscapeBlocked(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("symlink semantics differ on windows")
}
fs, dir := newFS(t)
outside := filepath.Join(dir, "outside.txt")
if err := os.WriteFile(outside, []byte("classified"), 0o600); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Drop a symlink inside the tenant dir pointing at the outside
// file. We do this via os directly because FS doesn't expose
// symlink creation (and rightfully so).
if err := os.Symlink(outside, filepath.Join(fs.Dir(), "escape")); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := fs.ReadFile("escape"); err == nil {
t.Errorf("ReadFile through symlink succeeded; expected error")
}
}
func TestRootIsolation(t *testing.T) {
// Two FS instances rooted at sibling dirs cannot see each other.
parent := t.TempDir()
a, err := Open(filepath.Join(parent, "a"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer a.Close()
b, err := Open(filepath.Join(parent, "b"))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer b.Close()
_ = a.WriteFile("note.md", []byte("a"))
if _, err := b.ReadFile("note.md"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
t.Errorf("b read a's file: %v", err)
}
if _, err := b.ReadFile("../a/note.md"); err == nil {
t.Errorf("b reached a via traversal")
}
}
func TestMissingFileReturnsErrNotFound(t *testing.T) {
fs, _ := newFS(t)
if _, err := fs.ReadFile("missing.md"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
t.Errorf("got %v", err)
}
if _, err := fs.Stat("missing.md"); !errors.Is(err, ErrNotFound) {
t.Errorf("got %v", err)
}
}
func TestPermissions(t *testing.T) {
if runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
t.Skip("permission semantics differ on windows")
}
fs, _ := newFS(t)
fi, err := os.Stat(fs.Dir())
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if mode := fi.Mode().Perm(); mode != 0o700 {
t.Errorf("expected 0700 on tenant dir, got %o", mode)
}
}